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1 Introduction
There is broad agreement in the literature about the fact that there is a pos-
itive relationship between parental income and college attendance. However
there is less agreement about why this relationship exists. The explanations
for this relationship fall broadly into two camps. The Þrst explanation is that
richer parents Þnd it less costly to send their children to college. Cameron
and Heckman distinguish between what they call long-term credit constraints
and short-term credit constraints. A short term credit constraint means that
parents cannot afford to send their children to college. Long term credit con-
straints refer to the notion that poorer parents have less resources to spend
on their childrens education throughout their life and thus they are less likely
to be in a position to attend college later on in life. The alternative explana-
tion is that children from richer parents have a lower distaste for education
and thus acquire more education. It is important from a policy point of
view to distinguish between these explanations. If children were short-term
credit constrained then the government might want to introduce a system
of loans or grants to encourage children from lower income backgrounds to
attend college. The problem with being credit constrained is that children
will have money once they graduate but they do not have the funds before
they go to college. If it was due to taste factors then access programs for
example might be more beneÞcial. To distinguish between these two factors
we would ideally like to conduct an experiment. This might involve taking a
group that is identical in all respects and giving one group increased loans to
attend college. This is not really feasible. However in 1995 the Minister for
Education in Ireland announced that undergraduate fees would be abolished.
In 1995/96 students paid half fees and in 1996/97 undergraduate fees were
completely abolished. The press release from the Department of Education
on February 8 1995 stated:
Todays decision on abolishing undergraduate fees aims at providing uni-
versal access to third level education. The psychological impact of todays
decision will encourage and allow people to consider pursuing a third level ed-
ucation as a very realisable option in their life choice... The abolition of third
level fees is a major step forward in improving access to higher education -
fees are no longer a barrier1
1In conjunction with this removal, the Minister also announced changes in the tax relief
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This policy will certainly relax the budget constraint. 2 . However this
policy alone does not affect the disutility associated with attending college.
In this paper I examine the effect of this policy on college attendance
by social class. In the Section 1, I outline a simple model which examines
the theoretical predictions of the effect of such a change in fees. In Section
2, I discuss the data set and the methodology used for the empirical work.
Section 3 provides preliminary results and discussion.
2 Model
Consider a model of educational attainment, similar to Dynarski (2000) and
Card (2000) in a world where there are no means tested grants and everyone
pays fees. Individuals differ by parental income and tastes for education
which is correlated with parental income.
V (S, c(t)) =
R s
0
(U(c(t))− γ(t))e−ρtdt+ R∞
s
(U(c(t))e−ρtdt
C is consumption. γ reßects disutility of schooling which depends on
parental income. We assume that dγ
dyp
< 0. As income increases disutility
falls. γ also depends on an individual effect ui where ui is iid Normal (0,1).
Students face a given interest rate, r(yp), where r is the opportunity cost
of acquiring funds. It depends on parental income. dr
dyp
< 0. It is assumed
that wealthier parents have easier access to capital markets and face a lower
interest rate.
A student also faces direct costs of schooling T (1 − A(yp)) where T is
tuition costs and A(yp) is the proportion of aid which the student gets from
the state. 0≤A≤ 1. We assume that aid is means tested. Let us consider a
simple system.We assume that children whos parents earn below a certain
arrangements for covenants.
2Ideally we would like to maintain lifetime incomes constant and simply give them a
loan so that we could distinguish between wealth effects and credit constraints.
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threshold value of income get more aid than those above the threshold.We
assume that the relationship between A and yp is such that for yp < yt(some
threshold value) A = Ah and for yp > yt A = Al where Ah > Al.This
implies that starting with a yp below the threshold, for small changes in yp
dA
dyp
= 0. For yp above the threshold, dAdyp = 0 for all changes in yp. For
changes in yp that cross the threshold then dAdyp < 0. This implies overall
that dA
dyp
≤ 0. A student will invest in schooling until the marginal cost of
acquiring funds=marginal rate of return. Let y(s, t) denote earnings by an
individual in period t with s years of schooling.
Then intertemporal budget constraint is:R∞
0
(c(t))e−rtdt = − R s
0
(T (t)(1−A(yp))e−rtdt+
R∞
s
(y(s, t)e−rtdt
MB(S) =
R∞
0
δy(s,s+τ)
dS
e−rτdτ
MC(S) = y(s, s) + T (s)(1− A(yp)) + 1λe−(ρ−r)sγ(s)
If we assume that post-school earnings do not change over the life-cycle
then so that y(s,t) = f(s) then
MB(S) = f 0(s)/r
An individuals optimal level of school is where the MB(S) = MC or
re-written:
f 0(s)
f(s)
= r{1 + T (1−A(yp)
f(s)
+
1
λ
e−(ρ−r)sγ(s)
f(s)
}
The left hand side measures the proportional increase in earnings per year
associated with a change in schooling. The right hand side is the annuitized
marginal cost of the Sth unit of schooling expressed as a fraction of foregone
earnings. Using Card (2001), if we assume that u(c(t))=log c(t), that tuition
costs are constant over the time in school, that the disutility of schooling
does not change over time and that tuition costs are small relative to lifetime
earnings then the right hand side is approximately equal to:
r(yp){1+
T (1−A(yp))
f(s)
+ e−ρsγ(yp, ui)}
This implies that optimal schooling s∗ is a function of:
s∗ = f(T,A, ρ, γ(yp), r(yp), ui)
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dS
dA
=
−rT
f 00(s)− rf 0(s)− rγf 0(s)e−ρs + rγρf(s)e−ρs > 0 (1)
This implies that as aid increases optimal schooling increases. Appendix
2 provides more detail.
When there is no disutility associated with schooling , i.e. γ = 0, then
dS
dA
=
−rT
f 00(s)− rf 0(s) > 0 (2)
Examining the effect of parental income on schooling:
dS
dyp
=
−g0(yp)
g0(s)
(3)
where:
g0(s) = f 00(s)− rf 0(s)− rγf 0(s)e−ρs + rγρf(s)e−ρs (4)
and
g0(yp) = − dr
dyp
[f(s) + T (1− A) + e−ρsγf(s)]− dγ
dyp
re−ρsf(s) + rT
dA
dyp
(5)
Since dr
dyp
and dγ
dyp
< 0,the Þrst two terms are positive. The Þrst term
reßects credit constraints. Wealthier parents can borrow at lower rates. The
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second term reßects the disutility of schooling, children of wealthier parents
have a lower distaste for schooling. The third term however is less than
or equal to zero. It is negative if the changes in yp cross the threshold,
otherwise it is equal to zero. This implies that the sign of g0(yp) > 0 unless
the negative sign on the third term in the above equation outweighs the
positive effect of the other two terms. With increases in parental income,
schooling will generally increase as both r will fall and γ will fall. However
if by increasing parental income, government aid is cut there is some chance
that these children which are just above the threshold value of income have
lower schooling than those below the threshold assuming that the decrease
in aid is substantial and outweighs any credit constraint or disutility effect.
That is
dS
dyp
= −g
0(yp)
g0(s) > 0 if g
0(yp) > 0
Under the above assumptions, as parental income increases, optimal school-
ing increases.
The expression for the term dS
dypdA
is more complicated. If we take the
simple case where we assume that A is exogenous, γ = 0, f 00(s) < 0, f 000(s) =
0, then of dS
dypdA
is:
dS
dypdA
=
− dr
dyp
T [(f 00(s))2−rf 0(s)f 00(s)+r2f 00(s)[(f(s)+T (1−A)]
[f 00(s)−rf 0(s)]3 < 0
dS
dypdA
< 0.
As aid increases, the gap in optimal schooling levels by parental income
falls.
It becomes more difficult to sign this term with the added assumptions
that γ > 0 and dA
dyp
6= 0.
Next, we want to examine the proportions attending college. The signs
on this will depend on what we got above.
Let us assume that we can write s∗ as
s∗ = f(T,A, ρ, γ(yp), r(yp))− ui
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We assume that attending college involves achieving at least a level of s,
sc.
Therefore:
P(s∗>sc) = P(s∗ = f(T,A, ρ, γ(yp), r(yp))− ui > sc)
P (ui < f(T,A, ρ, γ(yp)− sc) = Φ(uc)
How does income affect the proportion of people attending college?
dΦ(uc)
δyp
= φ(uc)
δuc
δyp
> 0 if δs
∗
dyp
> 0
As income increases, the proportion of people going to college increases.
The cutoff uc increases with income (δucδyp > 0 if
δs∗
dyp
> 0) . Under these
assumptions, the model predicts that a larger proportion of people attend
college from higher income groups for two reasons. Firstly they have a lower
cost of paying tuition and also they have a lower distaste for college.
What happens the gap in the proportions, attending college by income
group,as A increases? What is the sign of d
2Φ(uc)
δypδA
? For example does the dif-
ference in the proportion going to college by income group narrow or widen?
d2Φ(uc)
δypδA
= +φ(uc)
δuc
δypδA
+ φ0(uc) δucδyp
δuc
δA
If we assume that δs
∗
dyp
> 0δs
∗
dA
> 0 and δs
∗
dypδA
< 0.
The Þrst term ( term 1) in this expression, is negative. The term δuc
δypδA
shows what happens the gap in the cutoffs between the low and high income
people as A increases. In this case, this has a negative sign which says
that the gap narrows as A increases. The sign of the second term(term2)
φ0(uc) δucδyp
δuc
δA
is determined by the sign of φ0(uc). If φ0(uc) < 0(> 0) then term
2 is negative(positive). If φ0(uc) < 0 (> 0), then uc is located to the right (
left) of zero.
This would mean that the gap the between the lower and higher income
group in the proportion going to college should narrow as aid increases. How-
ever if φ0(uc) > 0 then the result is ambiguous. From this model we cannot
predict exactly whether a higher proportion of low or high income people
7
will go to college as result of the policy change. The introduction of free fees
coincided with the abolition of tax relief for covenants. If as the departments
press release stated covenants beneÞt the better off disproportionately, then
this suggests that the introduction of free fees for the better off was likely to
be offset by the changes in tax regulations so their budget constraint may be
unaffected.
In Ireland, there are some students who always had their tuition paid by
the state based on their family income or on what speciÞc course they were
taken. I am going to ignore the second group for the moment. Let us suppose
that there are three income groups, low middle and high. We can assume
that A=1 for the low income group and that A<1 for the other two groups.
With the introduction of free fees for everyone, we would expect no change
in the lower income group and the proportion attending college in both of
the other two groups to increase. However as we said already, it is not clear
whether the gap in the proportions attending college between the group 2
and 3 actually widens or narrows.
3 Proposed Methodology and Data
Since the predictions from the theoretical model are ambiguous. To examine
the impact of the policy, I propose to use the data on school leavers and the
difference-in-difference estimator to examine the impact of the policy. This
can be calculated using a limited dependent variable model such as a probit
or logit model.
cit=β0+β1(ypmed)+β2(Yphigh)+β3free+β4(free∗ypmed)+β5(free∗
yphigh)+δ(X)
Where cit is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the person i goes to
college from cohort t, zero otherwise. Let us assume for convenience that
there are three levels of parental income, low, medium and high. We will
assume that individuals from the lower level of income are already entitled
to free fees. Free is a dummy variable =1 if free fees have been introduced
for everyone,zero otherwise. X reßects other control variables.
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The coefficients β1(β2) reßects the difference in average attendance rates
between the low and medium(high) income levels before the free fees was
introduced. The coefficient β3 reßects average changes in attendance rates
for the lower income group before and after the policy was initiated. β4(β5)
measures the change in attendance by the medium(high) income group over
and above the low income group. This is a difference in difference estimator.
If we assume 1) that this change in policy did not affect lower-socioeconomic
groups and 2) this was the only policy change that took place over this time
period then we can interpret this as the true effect of the policy change.
There may be some problems with assumption 2). It is possible over this
time period that there were other policies aimed speciÞcally at increasing
attendance from lower socio-economic groups.3 We may also have to control
for changes in the quality of students over time.
Students begin second level education in Ireland at about the age of 12.
Second level education consists of a junior cycle which lasts 3 years and a
senior cycle which lasts for 2 to 3 years. At the end of the senior cycle,
students take a state exam called the Leaving CertiÞcate. Access to third
level courses depends on the results obtained. If a student gets the required
number of points for a particular course in their Leaving CertiÞcate, they
are automatically entitled to enter the course.The data set which I use is
the School Leavers survey available annually from 1980-19994. It surveys
about 2000 students each year about one year after leaving school and has
information about their school experience, what they did after school, in-
formation on college attended, course taken , employment record etc. One
of the drawback of the data set is that it does not provide information on
parental earnings. However there is information on parental occupation. I
use this occupational coding information to form 7 social classes. I have a
separate category for farmers. These are described in the Appendix. I do
not know whether a given student would have been entitled to a grant. I
only know for those who attended whether they received a grant or not. The
probability of receiving a grant increases with social class number. Farmers
have quite a high probability of receiving a grant also.(See Appendix table
A1 for details). I limit my sample to those who left with their Leaving Cert
completed.
3For instance the targeted initiative was launched by the HEA in 1996/1997 see Osborne
and Leith(2000)
4I do not have the 1997 and 1999 data yet.
9
4 Preliminary Results and Discussion
Table 1 shows the result from the probit estimates. From the Þrst column
we see that there is a signiÞcant difference in college attendance rates across
social classes. The Professional and Farmers groups have a high probability
of attending. However looking at the second column, there is not a signiÞcant
change in these proportions over time. This would indicate that the removal
of the fees barrier did not result in signiÞcant changes in college attendance.
There are many possible reasons for this result . Firstly 1998 may be too
early to look at the effects of the policy change or I may not have enough data
to identify a true effect. Secondly fees may represent a very small component
of the cost of attending college. The opportunity cost and other direct costs
such as maintenance costs could be signiÞcant. I have looked at students
who lived in cities. It seems reasonable that their maintenance costs would be
smaller so that a reduction in fees might be important. For Dublin city, there
is a signiÞcant negative correlation between living in this area and college
attendance but this does not change signiÞcantly after 1998.This suggests for
those where fees make up a large proportion of their direct costs of college,
the attendance rate did not seem to change. For the other cities there are
no signiÞcant effects. Over this period, Ireland would have experienced a
boom so that the opportunity cost of schooling might have increased a lot.
If this affected all classes equally then the difference in difference estimator
should control for this. However if particular social classes were affected
differently then I cannot identify this affect. Another possible reason why
there appears to be no signiÞcant changes in college attendance after free
fees were introduced relates to selectivity. I have limited my sample to those
who had completed their Leaving Cert in each year. I need to consider the
likely effects of this. Firstly, if policy makers have been more successful at
encouraging students to complete their Leaving Cert and these were marginal
students then we would expect the proportion of students going to college
from this larger base might actually fall.This may not necessarily be a bad
thing as we are encouraging more people to stay on in school. From Table
3, over the period 1995-1998,there does not appear to be a large changes in
differences in Leaving Cert completion by social class. The other problem
which I have not controlled for is Leaving Cert performance. Of course not
everyone who wants to go to college can go, they must meet certain points
requirements. The School-Leavers survey does have information on Leaving
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Cert grades. I used this to calculate the total points. However there is a
lot of missing grades for 1998 so I am not sure how reliable the data is for
this period. Table 2 shows the results for the probit estimates using 1994
and 1995. We see that part of the gap in college attendance by social class
goes away once we control for points. This could reßect long-term family
income problems, where wealthier parents have more resources to spend on
their children over their life-time. The Minister for Education in her press
release stated that the abolition of undergraduate fees is just one strand of
the... overall strategy... A wide range of initiatives and improvements have
been implemented at Þrst and second level. These policies will take much
longer to take effect and may explain why there has not been a signiÞcant
change in the gap in college attendance by social class.
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Table 1
Proportion Attending College 1994,1995,1998
n 4748 4748
constant -.64(.07) -.67(.11)
sclass1 1.10(.09) 1.12(.11)
sclass2 .84(.08) .93(.10)
sclass3 .59(.08) .61(.11)
sclass4 .20(.08) .24(.10)
sclass5 .12(.10) .17(.12)
sclass7 .77(.08) .78(.11)
y98 -.05(.04) .06(.15)
sc1*y98 -.04(.19)
sc2*y98 -.23(.17)
sc3*y98 -.07(.18)
sc4*y98 -.14(.18)
sc5*y98 -.15(.22)
sc7*y98 -.01(.18)
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Table 2: Proportion Who Attended College
1994 & 1995 with information on total points
n 2931 2931
coefficients prob coefficients prob at mean points
constant -.55(.09) 2.56(.13) -
sclass1 1.07(.12) 70 .45(.14) .56
sclass2 .86(.11) .62 .36(.13) .53
sclass3 .56(.11) .51 .27(.13) .49
sclass4 .19(.11) .36 .09(.13) .42
sclass5 .07(.12) .32 .04(.15) .40
sclass6 - .39 .39
sclass7 .72(.11) .54 .38(.11) .54
points*10 .008(.0003)
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Table 3
Proportion of Students Leaving School with Completed Leaving Certs
by Social Class.
1994 1995 1996 1998
total .79 .82 .81 .81
sc1 .89 .92 .91
sc2 .88 .90 .89
sc3 .87 .89 .85
sc4 .75 .76 .76
sc5 .66 .72 .68
sc6 .52 .66 .61
sc7 .89 .87 .90
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5 Appendix 1
Key for Social Class
sc1 higher professional, managerial, proprietors
sc2 lower professional, lower managerial
sc3 other non-manual
sc4 skilled manual
sc5 semi-skilled manual
sc6 unskilled manual
sc7 farmers
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Table A1
Proportion Attending College who Receive Grants by Social Class
1994 & 1995
total
sc1 .25(.03)
sc2 .39(.02)
sc3 .55(.03)
sc4 .78(.02)
sc5 .75(.05)
sc6 .92(.04)
sc7 .67(.03)
Table A2
Average Total Points of Those who did Leaving Cert by Social Class
1994 1995 1996 1998(?)
total 284 287 291 310
sc1 352 343 378
sc2 321 327 327
sc3 280 288 299
sc4 235 250 274
sc5 228 232 264
sc6 227 217 257
sc7 303 293 330
Table A3
Proportion Attending College by Social Class
1994 1995 1996 1998
total .47 .48 .44 .46
sc1 .67 .67 .68
sc2 .62 .58 .53
sc3 .47 .49 .47
sc4 .29 .38 .30
sc5 .30 .31 .27
sc6 .29 .21 .27
sc7 .55 .53 .56
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6 Appendix 2
The First order condition is:
f 0(s)
f(s)
= r{1 + T (1−A)
f(s)
+ e−ρsγ(yp, ui)}
This can be re-written as:
g(s, A, γ, yp) = f
0(s)− rf(s)− rT (1−A)− re−ρsγf(s) = 0
The 2nd order condition for a maximum requires that g0(s) < 0.
This implies that
g0(s) =f 00(s)− rf 0(s)− rγf 0(s)e−ρs + rγρf(s)e−ρs < 0
g0(A) = rT
To Þnd the relationship between aid and schooling.
dS
dA
= −g
0(A)
g0(s) =
−rT
f 00(s)−rf 0(s)−rγf 0(s)e−ρs+rγρf(s)e−ρs
This is positive since g0(s) < 0.
As aid increases, optimal schooling increases.
When γ = 0, that is, there is no disutility of schooling then the relation-
ship between S and A is :
dS
dA
= −g
0(a)
g0(s) =
−rT
f 00(s)−rf 0(s)
Now we examine the relationship between parental income and optimal
schooling. Remember that γ, r and A depend on parental income. dr
dyp
<
0, dγ
dyp
< 0. We assume that children whos parents earn below a certain
threshold value of income get more aid than those above the threshold.We
assume that the relationship between A and yp is such that for yp < yt(some
threshold value) A = Ah and for yp > yt A = Al where Ah > Al.This implies
that starting with a yp below the threshold, for small changes in yp that
dA
dyp
= 0. For yp above the threshold, dAdyp = 0 for all changes in A. For
changes in yp that cross the threshold then dAdyp > 0
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g(s, A, γ, yp) = f
0(s)− rf(s)− rT (1−A)− re−ρsγf(s) = 0
g0(yp) = − drdypf(s)− drdypT (1− A) + rT dAdyp − drdyp e−ρsγf(s)− dγdyp re−ρsf(s)
g0(yp) = − drdyp [f(s) + T (1− A) + e−ρsγf(s)]−
dγ
dyp
re−ρsf(s) + rT dA
dyp
Since dr
dyp
and dγ
dyp
< 0,the Þrst two terms are positive. The Þrst term
reßects credit constraints. Wealthier parents can borrow at lower rates. The
second term reßects the disutility of schooling, children of wealthier parents
have a lower distaste for schooling. The third term however is less than
or equal to zero. It is negative if the changes in yp cross the threshold,
otherwise it is equal to zero. This implies that the sign of g0(yp) > 0 unless the
negative sign on the third term in the above equation outweights the positive
effect of the other two terms. With increases in parental income, schooling
will generally increase as both r will fall and γ will fall. However if by
increasing parental income, government aid is cut there is some chance that
that these children which are just above the threshold value of income have
lower schooling than those below the threshold assuming that the decrease
in aid is substantial and outweighs any credit constraint or disutility effect.
dS
dyp
= −g
0(yp)
g0(s) > 0 if g
0(yp) > 0
The expression for the term dS
dypdA
is more complicated. Even if we take
the simple case where we assume that A is exogenous, γ = 0, f 00(s) < 0,
f 000(s) = 0, then the sign of dS
dypdA
is ambiguous. In this case it is equal to:
dS
dypdA
=
− dr
dyp
T [(f 00(s))2−rf 0(s)f 00(s)+r2f 00(s)[(f(s)+T (1−A)]
[f 00(s)−rf 0(s)]3
− dr
dyp
T > 0 since dr
dyp
< 0 and [f 00(s)− rf 0(s)]3 < 0
Taking what is inside the square bracket of the numerator:
We have:[(f 00(s))2 − rf 0(s)f 00(s) + r2f 00(s)[(f(s) + T (1−A)]
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collecting terms we have:
f 00(s){f 00(s)− rf 0(s) + r2(f(s) + T (1−A)}
f 00(s){f 00(s)− r(f 0(s)− rf(s)− rT (1− A)}
From the Þrst order condition we know that (f 0(s)−rf(s)+rT (1−A) = 0
so we are left with( f 00(s))2 which is positive. The numerator is positive
and the denominator is negative so we have,
dS
dypdA
< 0.
The terms become more complicated with the added assumptions of γ > 0
and dA
dyp
6= 0.
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